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OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENTOF MUNICIPALWATER
IN MEXICO
JACQUES LETONTODOT'

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
IN THE WATER INDUSTRY

First, private sector participation has to be differentiated from "privatization."
The term "privatization" was coined after the successful experience conducted in the
United Kingdom (UK) under Margaret Thatcher's leadership. This consisted in the
sale to private investors of most of the UK water companies. As we will see this
represents a very special type of arrangement whereby those companies were sold
forever to private operators that were entrusted, at the same time, with the
management rights of those companies and the obligations of providing the service
to the final clients within the constraints imposed by a regulation authority. This is
not the sort of arrangement that Suez Environment is promoting as it does represent
only one of the multiple solutions offered.
Second, private sector participation is not a new way of intervention born in
the UK in the 1980s. Early examples of this type of operations were introduced in
France in the middle of the eighteenth century in order to build canals to improve
trade conditions throughout the French territory. Private operators were given the
rights, through concession contracts, to build and operate the relevant infrastructures
and to receive tolls from the users of those canals.
Third, private sector participation is not an asset driven contract. It is true that,
in order to provide a certain service to the end users, certain infrastructures have to
be built or purchased. More particularly, in the case of water related services, the
operator has to make sure that the proposed infrastructure will procure the
appropriate level of treatment to provide either potable water or to treat effluents
whether domestic or industrial sources, but it should be clarified that design and
construction of the necessary infrastructures are not the goal of the private operator,
as its aim is and remains the provision of an adequate service at the lowest possible
price.
Finally, private sector participation is not a financial agreement. It is true that the
private operator might help in finding and securing the most advantageous sources
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of financing but, once again, this is not the driving force nor the main objective of
the private sector participation.
The main driver for the private sector participation in the water sector is the
provision of an efficient service to the final consumer providing access to a reliable
source of potable water and/or an adequate treatment of wastewater at acceptable
prices throughout the years.
Therefore, what private sector participation brings along is an injection of
efficiency and productivity in this public sector activity, as those are what private
companies are good at. It is also a way to introduce competition as, in most cases,
a private operator is retained after a competitive selection process which is bound
to lower costs and charges to be paid by the final consumers and, in certain cases,
to make the water and sanitation available to parts of the city population which are
deprived of it.
Two BASIC APPROACHES TO PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: THE CONTRACTUAL
AGREEMENT OR OWNERSHIP AGREEMENT

In the contractual agreement, a municipal government entrusts a private operator
with the provision of certain services, which could encompass all of the water and
waste water services or only part of those for a specified duration, at an agreed price
which could be paid either directly by the final consumers or by the municipal
government. The price depends on the scale of the agreement and/or local legal
constraints. Predefined indicators cover the extent and quality of the services
provided so that the municipal government or any other public body may regulate
the performance of the private operator.
In the ownership agreement, on top of defining the services to be performed and
the way to evaluate the performance of the private operator, the municipal
government requires it either to invest in the purchase of the existing assets, to
invest in the upgrading and/or replacement of some of the facilities and/or to design
and build new facilities, to improve the treatment and provision of the service, or
extend the coverage of the services. The most radical option is the full
"privatization," in the UK sense, where the ownership is transferred forever to
private operators.
Most of contracts stand in between those two extremes and are tailored to cater
to local constraints or financial constraints or any other considerations not directly
linked to the provision of the services per se. It can then be seen that between
service contracts at one end of the spectrum and full privatization at the other end,
several types of contracts may be considered by the municipal government and the
private operator to better address the local environment.
In between these two solutions stands the concession agreement which is the most
common in France. It is at the same time a contractual Agreement, whereby the
municipal government and the private operator define jointly the nature and extent
of the services to be provided, and an ownership agreement, whereby some of the
existing assets ar6 transferred to the concession company while the government
retains ownership of remaining assets. The agreement also defines the new facilities
and/or improvements to the existing facilities which will be owned, operated, and
financed by the concession company.
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In any case it should be stressed that whatever type of agreement is considered
suitable for a given city the control remains firmly in the hand of the public sector
due to the nature of the service provided. In this respect, to achieve a successful
contract it should include and provide: (i) clear objectives; (ii) clear regulation; and
(iii) clear standards. As already mentioned ownership may remain with the
municipal government or be transferred to the private operator. New facilities may
be financed by the government or by the private operator, without substantially
affecting the nature of the obligation of the private operator with respect to the
provision of the service. To this end, the private operator has to be assigned clear
goals and standards to comply with and to be able to rely on a consistent, unbiased
regulation. As we will see these aspects may have repercussions on the way private
operators and municipal governments will structure the local company to be formed
to provide the services.
In most cases water and sanitation services are provided by a municipal
government department that does not enjoy an independent legal existence. In very
few cases, the provider of the service has been structured as a company fully owned
and controlled by the municipal government. Generally, there is no contract
between the municipal government and the provider of the service nor between the
provider of the service and the final consumers. In many instances, the only
contractual document between the consumers and the service provider is the invoice
that reaches the mailbox of the end user. Considering this quite fuzzy environment,
the first possible solution to introduce private sector participation is to form a joint
venture between the existing public body and the private operator. This is a solution
which has been used very successfully in China. There, municipal governments,
first, were to create local companies to which all assets and obligations of the
previous departments were transferred and, second, to from a joint venture between
those newly formed water companies and the private operators. In this form of
association, the only documents that rule the association are the joint venture
contract and the shareholders agreement, where the extent and nature of the services
to be provided are described. This form of association is mostly used in developing
countries where the legal framework does not contemplate or allow for more
sophisticated type of contractual agreements.
A second option would be to complete the formation of the joint venture with the
signature of a formal contract between the joint venture itself and the municipal
government where all the obligations of the joint venture, as far as the provision of
the services is concerned, are documented and spelled out. The mere existence of
this contract, directly between the municipal government and the joint venture, is the
basis for regulation which is to be conducted directly by the municipal government.
In this scheme a weakness comes from the fact that the beneficiary of the service,
the municipal government is also the one to check the performance of the private
operator. This may lead to some difficulties as the municipal government may have
objectives that are incongruent with the objectives of the operator leading to
unsurpassable difficulties when assessing the effectiveness of the operation.
A third option would be another one between the joint venture and privatization,
where the management of the joint venture is entrusted to the private operator. This
strengthens the private operators' obligations and rights with respect to the joint
venture. In this new set up, it would also be beneficial to have a regulatory authority
defined independently from the municipal government so as to ensure that the
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monitoring of the performance of the private operator is conducted in a fair and
unbiased way.
This last sort of agreement resembles the French "affirmage" contract, which is
an agreement whereby the municipal government entrusts a private body with the
provision of a public service while retaining the ownership of the existing assets and
committing itself to own and finance all new required facilities. Ondeo Services
refers to delegated management to characterize contracts where the relationship
between all stake holders is defined clearly. Rights and obligations of the municipal
government, the private operator, the local operating company and the end users are
clearly defined. The regulation of the contract is performed by a public entity apart
from the above parties. This sort of set up which can be embodied in concession or
"affirmage" contracts are the ones which appear as the most effective and the less
prone to conflicts over the long life of these operations.
In this respect, strong regulation is vital to success. The operator needs to have
periodical assessment of its achievements so that there are no doubts about what has
been achieved and what remains to be completed. It also allows reformulation of
the objectives that may evolve with the passage of time and the evolution of the city.
It also is very important to mention that self-regulation by the private operator
itself is also a very strong regulation mechanism. A private operator will always try
to find ways around the difficulties he may encounter and find with the municipal
government the best possible solution, under given circumstances, to continue to
provide the service and find acceptable compromise with all stakeholders. All major
companies around the world in this business take pride of their success, fear failures
and are willing to devote all efforts to overcome possible difficulties. In this respect,
it should be remembered that private operators are very much aware of their
responsibilities vis-4-vis their clients and expect the same sort of commitment from
municipal governments and regulators with respect to the contracts by the
fulfillment of their obligations and responsibilities.
Last, I would like to say a few things about tariffs which are a very sensitive
issue. It is our strong belief that tariffs should cover the real economic price of the
service. It is true that pricing those services at their economic value might hurt
either the consumers or the municipal government and that under certain
circumstances it might not be achievable. But it is also our belief that if a municipal
government has to subsidize the provision of a certain service to the consumers, it
has to do so in a conscious and informed way rather than through cross-subsidizing
out of its general budget services, not sustainable if deprived from subsidies, should
not be offered to private operators because the biased structure of the tariffs will
ultimately impair the provision of the service.
In conclusion, I hope that the benefits of public sector participation and delegated
management are clearer. First, there is a clear distinction between the municipal
government functions and the provision of a service to the consumers. This
provides a clear separation between regulation and operation. It brings competition
and, in turn, lower costs to the final users. It brings also efficient financing and
private sector efficiencies so that focus can be on the service and the customer
satisfaction.

